Online auctions have changed the traditional trading methods in the business world today.
Introduction
Online auctions have become increasingly popular and accepted by trading community over the last few years. Businesses that are previously conducted in the bricks and mortars are now available in a global environment without geographical limitation. By using the Internet, sellers and buyers are free to trade their goods from around the world.
Currently, there are hundreds of thousands of online auctions that are conducted from various auction marketplaces such as Yahoo! Auction and eBay where bidders may obtain their desired items. Choosing an auction from the available auctions' pool may be risky. Since bidders may not know which auction to select, they are exposed with the risk of losing an auction or paying too high for the item being auctioned. Therefore, intelligent bidder agents that are equipped with various bidding strategies can assist in solving these problems. These agents can be applied to determine which auction that they participate and the appropriate bid that they can use when bidding in the auctions.
There are a few literatures that focus on the online auction market economy such as [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] . They focused on the human bidders or sellers with different risk behaviors and their preferences in auctioning and bidding processes. As the agent technology in auction marketplace is becoming a more dominant trend, it would be interesting to explore the market economy when agents are implemented. In [5] , it is found that human bidders tend to overbid in the auction participated. This would indicate that sellers obtain higher revenues when such scenarios are found in their auctions. When intelligent agents are used, sellers may assume that their revenues are reduced since these bidder agents do not overbid and always make a wider survey such as the available auctions than human bidders can participate before making decision on which
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auction to join and the bid amount to be submitted. In this paper, we would like to investigate the market economic effects from the perspective of bidders when they are represented by bidder agents. Moreover, sellers' reaction when bidder agents are introduced is also examined briefly especially when they are confronted with bidder agents of single type as well as bidder agents of multiple types.
In this paper, a simulated marketplace is used to generate multiple English auctions and participants. The surplus ratio, the average closing price of auctions won, the quantity of the desired items procured by winners of various types and seller's utility are examined. In Section 2, we discuss some related works, followed by the discussion of the market setup in Section 3. In Section 4, the results of the experiment are elaborated. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude and discuss avenues for future works.
Literature Review

English Auctions
In English auction, a price is successively raised until there is only one bidder who is willing to buy the item being auctioned [3] . In this auction, all bids submitted are made known to every participant immediately. Therefore, interested bidders can submit their new bids to outbid the current highest bidder. Besides that, before an auction is started, an item may have a reserved price in which the item will only be sold if the closing price of that auction is greater than that. This price is not known to the bidders.
One of the interesting scenarios found in English auctions is overbidding. Overbidding is a phenomenon in which the winner of an auction finds himself paying too much for the item being auctioned after the auction closes such as the finding in [5] . Lee and Malmendier explained that this phenomenon may be caused by the cost of switching, the limited attention and limited memory of bidders and the extra winning utility enjoyed by the winners. Also, auctions that attract overbidders would in turn increase the sellers' revenue.
In another research [6] , Hu and Bolivar investigated and analyzed multiple online auction properties including consumer surplus and their cross-relationships. They found that the rareness of the item makes the valuation process difficult, therefore bidders' valuation vary widely leading to high surplus ratios.
Intelligent Agents
According to [7] , [8] , an intelligent agent is a computer system that is capable of flexible autonomous action in order to meet its design objectives. The term flexible means that an intelligent agent must be responsive, proactive and social. It should perceive its environment and respond in a timely fashion to changes that occur in it. Meanwhile, it must not simply act in response to its environment. It should be able to exhibit opportunistic, goal-directed behaviors and take the initiative where appropriate. Moreover, it must be able to interact with its environment with other artificial agents and humans in order to complete its own problems and to help others with their problems.
Due to these properties, agents have been implemented in many areas such as the electricity distribution management system, CIDIM [9] and online auctions. By using bidding agents in online auctions, these agents would reduce the burden of their users by searching and monitoring different auctions according to the specifications provided by their users.
Bidding Strategies of Intelligent Agents
Since the auction protocols are well-defined, users can trust their bidder agents easily to accomplish the tasks delegated and communication among agents and with auction houses is simplified [10] . Hence, many bidding agents and their strategies are studied by researchers.
The works of [11] , [12] were studied from the heuristic approach. He et al. [13] , [14] contributed their results from the approach of neuro-fuzzy technique. Lim et al. [15] , [16] studied the use of the grey prediction model in forecasting the closing price of an online auction which would help bidders in making a better bid. Furthermore, some of the bidding strategies are evolved from the human bidders' behaviors such as bid sniping as studied in [17] .
Simulated Marketplace
In this work, a simulated marketplace is used to model a real auction house where multiple English auctions are conducted. All auctions in this marketplace are based on the symmetric independent private values (SIPV) auctions [4] , [18] . It is assumed that:
a. Each auction is selling a single indivisible object (single-unit auction). b. Bidders know their own private valuations only. Even if he knows about other bidders' valuation, this would not contribute to a change of his valuation. c. All bidders are indistinguishable (symmetry). d. Unknown valuations are independently and identically (iid) distributed and using continuous random variables (independence, symmetry and continuity). In this simulated marketplace, the auction parameters such as the number of auctions, the number of bidders and the bidding strategies are determined. There are three different bidding strategies, namely the Greedy agents [19] , the Heuristic agents [11] and the Sniping agents [17] . The greedy strategy is selected because of its bidding attribute. Some bidders may use their agents to look for auctions with the lowest current bids with the hope to pay minimally to win an auction. Next, Heuristic agents would represent another group of bidders who are well prepared before participating in any auction. They do not only consider the current bid, but also other factors such as the timeline and auctions available. Lastly, the sniping strategy is taken into account because it avoids bidding war [17] . These are the group of bidders who are keen to obtain the items desired but are impatient with longer auction closing time.
Initially, the system prepares the marketplace by generating auctions, sellers and bidder agents based on some predefined settings. Both sellers/bidders are assigned a reserve price/private valuation randomly based on a normal distribution which is generated by providing a mean value and a standard deviation value of the actual closing prices collected from online auctions. Then, bidder agents are free to submit their bids according to their preferences. A higher bid dominates the auction. A universal time is used in this marketplace and the time steps are discrete and indivisible. Throughout the whole bidding process of different auctions, bidding histories are recorded for data analyses.
Bidder Agents and Bidding Strategies
There are three types of bidder agents considered in this marketplace which are the Greedy agent, the Heuristic agent and the Sniping agent. A Greedy agent would always look for an auction with the lowest current bid as its target auction (Fig. 1) . Then it would increase the current bid randomly with an increment from a predefined range. The agent's objective is to pay minimally to win an auction. In the case where multiple auctions are found to have the lowest current price, the first auction found is to be selected as the target auction for an agent.
Next, a Heuristic agent considers four tactics in its bidding process. Firstly, the remaining time it has in the market. Secondly, it considers the remaining auctions in the market. Thirdly, it considers the bidder's willingness of bargaining. Lastly, it considers the desperateness of obtaining the item. By combining these four tactics, a new suggested bid is proposed. If the difference between the current price and the suggested bid is greater than a preset threshold, it is further modified based on the current highest bid to avoid submitting a high bid in an auction (Fig. 2) .
Lastly, a Sniping agent would hold its bid until the last time step of an auction with the hope of outbidding others while giving them insufficient time to react. The sniped bid is a sum of the current bid of an auction with an increment from a predetermined range (Fig. 3) . Similarly, when there is more than one auction that closes on the last possible time step, the first auction found by an agent would be selected as its target auction. 
Experimental Analysis
Experimental Setup
In this experiment, markets fully populated by agents of the same type and agents of various types are simulated separately. Here, we are interested to study the competition that occurs among homogeneous bidder agents as well as the competition that occurs among heterogeneous bidder agents. In the first experiment, a marketplace fully occupied by Heuristic agents is considered. 90 auctions are generated and the performances of 900 Heuristic agents are evaluated (homogeneous environment). In the second experiment, 900 bidder agents with various bidding strategies participate in 90 auctions generated (heterogeneous environment). In both experiments, the same market is conducted repeatedly 10 times. After that, the performances of these bidder agents are analysed and a comparison between the performances obtained in both experiments is conducted.
In the first measurement, the consumer surplus ratio (CSR) introduced in [6] 
(1) where j is the type of winners, V Hi is the winner's private valuation in auction i , V Fi is the final winning bid in auction i , N i is the number of bids of item i and N m is the median number of bids across all the auctions conducted. By considering the number of bids found in an auction and also the median number of bids across all the auctions conducted, the factor of number of bids received is minimized as in various auctions; some auctions may only receive a small number of bids compared to others which in turn would affect the closing price of that auction. On the other hand, the average seller's utility is calculated. As suggested by [20] , sellers extract more revenues from auctions with higher number of bidders. In this market, bidder agents may submit their bids in any auction at their will. Some of the auctions may receive more bids compared to other auctions. Therefore, by using the ratio instead of the surplus, the factor of having different values of winning bids in different auctions (due to the number of bids received in an auction) is minimized. The equation is given as below: Table I shows the results obtained from both of the experiments. On average, winners of type Heuristic received 0.1315 as their average CSR in homogeneous environment. On the other hand, Greedy agents, Heuristic agents and Sniping agents obtained 0.0817, 0.1013 and 0.0110 respectively as their average CSR in the heterogeneous environment. A high value in this CSR would indicate that the winner receives a high surplus compared to his own private valuation after minimizing the influence of the number of bids received in an auction. The Sniping agents received the lowest utility because they ignored the auctions that are not closing soon but may return to them a better utility if they were winning in these auctions. When comparing the average CSR between Heuristic agents in Env 1 and Env 2, they received lower ratio as competition arises among groups of various agents.
Results and Discussions
Next, 22.6 and 87.8 auctions on average are closed with winners in Env 1 and Env 2 respectively. In Env 1, since all of these Heuristic agents are equipped with the same strategy and are free to join any auction, they may end up bidding in similar auctions while neglecting the less promising auctions. Consequently, 74.89% of the auctions are closed without winners. Conversely, when various types of agents are populated in the market, they may select different auctions to join based on their strategies and thus encourage more successful trades. From Table I , Heuristic agents obtained 53.56% of the items being auctioned (in Env 2) in the market. This can be credited to their auction selection strategy that always bid in the most promising auctions based on the expected utility calculated and their bidding strategy that considers the available auction information. It is worth noticing that Sniping agents obtained more items than Greedy agents due to their sniping capability of giving insufficient time to their counterparts to react. Besides that, simply looking at the lowest current bid may lead the agents to jump from an auction with higher probability of winning to other more risky auctions.
From Table I also, other information is retrieved. On average, each auction that is closed with a winner has a closing price of 373.1478 (in Env 1) and 344.6544 (in Env 2). In addition, from the sellers' perspective, they received 0.3088 and 0.2497 as their average utility in Env 1 and Env 2 respectively. This utility indicates the gross margin of the sellers. In other words, generally sellers of the completed auctions gained 30.88% and 24.97% (after multiplying with 100%) from their payments received as their profit in both environments. Lastly, on average, there are 26.8 bids (Env 1) and 14.7 bids (Env 2) received in every completed auction (those that were closed with winner).
By comparing the results from both experiments, when homogeneous agents are competing with one another in a market, their average auction closing price is higher than the average auction closing price in a market of heterogeneous agents. Those homogeneous agents with similar bidding strategy would most likely participate in few auctions and neglect the rest of the auctions unattended. Therefore, the final closing price increases as the competition among buyers increases. It is supported by the average median number of bids submitted in a completed auction (26.8 bids and 14.7 bids in Env 1 and Env 2 respectively). This finding is also consistent with the suggestion in [20] .
It is observed that sellers achieved 30.88% and 24.97% profit margin from markets fully populated by homogeneous and heterogeneous agents respectively. Even though a market with single type of agents produced a higher returned margin, in terms of the number of successful auctions, the market fully resided by homogeneous agents is worse than the market fully occupied by agents of various types. With a total of 90 English auctions generated, on average, 22.6 items were successfully sold in the former market compared to 87.8 items traded successfully in the latter market. Hence, if the average seller's profit is calculated based on the average auction closing price, the average seller's utility and the average number of auctions that are traded successfully, the former market would generate 2604.1537 compared to the latter market that would produce 7556.0859. Based on the profit calculated, sellers may prefer heterogeneous bidder agents instead of homogeneous bidder agents as their auctions' participants since they bring more profit to sellers.
Conclusion and Future Works
In conclusion, the performances of using agents in bidding auctions are tested in a simulated marketplace. From the experiment, market economy is studied when it is populated by homogeneous agents and heterogeneous agents respectively. By analyzing the empirical results obtained, in a market that is fully populated by homogeneous bidder agents, even though they obtained the highest average CSR (0.1315) compared to their value (0.1013) found in a market fully occupied by various types of agents, they performed badly in terms of the number of winning auctions (25.11%). This finding is similar to the results obtained in [21] which stated that multiple strategic buyers with the same strategy performed worse than their performance in situation where other types of bidders are present. Meanwhile, a market fully populated by heterogeneous bidder agents may achieve higher closing rate of 97.56% due to their various bidding strategies that led them to different auctions. Eventually, a healthier competitive environment was created. On the other hand, as the online auction marketplaces are evolving towards the implementation of agent technology, sellers would prefer the participation of heterogeneous bidder agents compared to homogeneous bidder agents since it guarantees more sales and profit.
There are still many interesting aspects which are not included in this work, one of them would be the capability of prediction. It would be useful if agents with prediction capability are implemented in participating auctions.
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